This Report, which was prepared by the General Secretariat and submitted to both governments on December 19, 2001, recounts the action taken in accordance with these recommendations and the results achieved, in support of the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua.

On December 6, 1999, the Permanent Council of the OAS met in special session to consider the situation that had arisen between Honduras and Nicaragua over the ratification of a maritime delimitation treaty between Colombia and Honduras.  The following day, the Council approved a resolution in support of the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, CP/RES. 757 (1216/99), which asked the Secretary General, with the concurrence of the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua, to appoint a special representative whose mandate would be "exclusively to evaluate the situation, facilitate dialogue, and formulate recommendations aimed at easing tension and preventing acts that could affect peace in the Hemisphere."  The resolution also requested that the representative of the Secretary General report to the Council on the implementation and the results of the measures taken to fulfill the Council's mandate.  

Between December 1999 and March 2000, the Special Representative appointed by the Secretary General, Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi, brokered three cumulative agreements between the Governments of Honduras and Nicaragua.  

The first accord, concluded by the Foreign Ministers of the parties in Miami on December 30, 1999, during a period of high tension, created a framework to separate military forces and develop confidence and security-building measures by freezing military deployments to pre-crisis levels.  

The second agreement, concluded February 7, 2000, in San Salvador, El Salvador, defined tension-reducing measures in the Caribbean Sea, including an agreement to not maintain any new military or police posts, to refrain from carrying out actions that could provoke incidents or serve as an obstacle to resolving any controversy by peaceful means, and establish a combined Honduran-Nicaraguan patrol mechanism.  

The third agreement, concluded on March 7, 2000 at the headquarters of the Organization, took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. This Memorandum completed the confidence and security-building mechanisms agreed upon in Miami and San Salvador by setting forth detailed provisions for combined patrols in the Caribbean, for controls on military activity near the land border, and for coordinated patrols within the two countries� jurisdictional waters in the Gulf of Fonseca.  

In late February 2001, after almost a year of relative calm, tensions resurfaced around claims and counter-claims of violations of the confidence-building measures agreed-to the year before.  In order to address the mounting tension, a meeting was held at OAS headquarters on March 16, 2001, between the Special Representative (since June 2000, the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization) and the Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Honduras and Nicaragua.

The Technical Verification Agreement, developed during those talks, more clearly defined existing confidence-building measures and established additional measures to reduce tensions between the two countries.  Through the Agreement, the Parties also invited third countries to provide technical experts, who, acting under the auspices of the Organization, and with the support of the General Secretariat, would verify Honduran and Nicaraguan compliance with the agreements reached.   In this connection, the Parties, through a joint letter addressed to the Secretary General, requested that the General Secretariat verify compliance of eight specific confidence-building measures.  

On the basis of the Technical Verification Agreement, the General Secretariat, working with the parties, devised a concrete plan to verify two of the points contained in the letter from the vice ministers.  These two points centered around verifying the location and composition of the military and police posts along the land frontier, and in the Caribbean Sea (the number and composition of the military and police posts along the land border and in the Caribbean Sea had been frozen at their September 1, 1999 levels by the San Salvador and Washington Agreements of 1999, and 2000, respectively).  

An Agreement for an International In Situ Verification Mission was signed by the parties and the General Secretariat on June 7, 2001.  The Agreement provided the specific mandate and operational details for conducting the verification mission, and detailed the location of the border posts.  Discussions prior to the conclusion of the Agreement provided an opportunity for each Party to raise comments or concerns regarding the list of border positions being presented for verification by the other Party.  

2.                  Purpose and Composition of the Mission

Pursuant to the Agreement for the Verification Mission, the OAS Mission had two objectives The first was to �verify the number and location of military and police posts along the land border, and the number of persons assigned to work in them,� and the second was to �verify that the military and police posts in the Caribbean Sea were being kept at the same level as on September 1, 1999.�[1]^/  

To fulfill these objectives, an OAS Verification Mission undertook two visits to the land border and one visit to the Parties� adjacent area in the Caribbean Sea.  During the first visit, July 16-23, 2001, the OAS Mission verified those border posts along the western-half of the land border.  On the second trip, August 15-21, 2001, the OAS Mission verified the military and police posts in the Caribbean Sea.  During the third visit, October 14-18, 2001, the Mission verified the border posts along the eastern-half of the land border.  

The OAS Mission was composed of political affairs officers, who are advisors to the Assistant Secretary General, along with technical experts in military affairs provided by the Governments of Argentina and Brazil.  The political affairs officers planned and led the missions.

      Civilian officials from Honduras and Nicaragua participated in the verification process as observers during the first and third visits.  At the request of the Parties, however, they did not participate in the mission on the Caribbean Sea.  This participation represented an additional confidence-building measure, since civilian officials were able to visit military and police posts in the neighboring country.  At the same time, they witnessed the transparency with which the OAS verification team performed its work.  At the request of the Parties, the members of the Verification Mission were not accompanied by the civilian officials from the two governments when it undertook its verification mission in the Caribbean Sea.  

Appendix A contains a list of the persons who participated in the verification missions, on behalf of both the OAS and the two governments.  

The two governments provided security for the Mission at all times during their visit to both sides of the land border area, with Honduras supplying a joint military and police escort, and Nicaragua a military escort supported by an OAS mine-clearing vehicle.  The Armed Forces of the two countries provided helicopters for travel to remote, inaccessible areas.  

It is important to note that the Mission was made possible thanks to the contributions of funds, materials, and human resources from the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Mexico, Spain and the United States, made through the Fund for Peace of the Organization of American States.

3.                  First Visit:  Western Land Border Area  

            The Verification Mission conducted its first in situ visit to both countries from July 16 to 23.  During the first few days, the Mission held meetings in the two capitals with high officials from the Foreign, Defense, Interior, and Security Ministries and the Army, to finalize details of the Mission. Following those meetings, the parties and the OAS agreed not to visit two Honduran posts (Guapinol and Froyl�n Turcios) since they were too far from the border to be considered border posts.  

From July 18 to 22, the Mission visited 38 military and police posts on both sides of the western part of the land border, from approximately the middle of the Isthmus to the Fonseca Gulf, covering about 1,440 kilometers.

At each military or police post along the border, the members of the Verification Mission asked the official in charge questions to ascertain the number of persons assigned there, the quantity and type of arms stored, and other nearby posts.  In most cases, the civilian population in the area were also asked the same questions.  The six representatives of the two governments observed all the interviews and inspections.

At the posts of the armed forces, the Mission also inspected the military installations, to verify that the equipment was consistent with or corresponded to the number of staff assigned to each post.  The Mission observed that there were recent improvements in the living and sanitary facilities at most of the Nicaraguan military posts.  In the opinion of the Mission, the sole purpose of these improvements was to enhance the living conditions of the soldiers at these difficult, isolated places.

As for the police posts, the Mission found some discrepancies in the number of officers assigned on both sides of the border. Those differences were, however, minimal.  Moreover, the general trend was for fewer officers to be assigned to the border than the numbers reported to the General Secretariat by the governments.  The Mission was told that the reason for that was the reduced amount of financial and human resources assigned to the police force in the two countries.

In Honduras, the number of police officers assigned to each post was not fully consistent with the information provided to the General Secretariat by the Honduran Government.[2]^/  In two cases the discrepancy in the number of officers had to do with different factors:  the police post at Las Selvas was closed and the officers had been transferred to the Lodosa post, thereby increasing the number assigned to the latter.  The Mission also discovered that the police post located in Azacualpa had been closed.  The Mission concluded that the omission was the result of an administrative error by the Honduran Government.  On the Nicaraguan border, they found that the police post at Guasaule had four more officers than expected.  They also found that a police post in the village of Cinco Pinos had seven officers who were not on the list of posts to be verified, even though it was only two kilometers from the border. The Government of Nicaragua did not include this post in the list of the posts to be inspected since it considered it to be a post attending to the local residents of the town of Cinco Pinos, rather than a post assigned border duties.  

Appendix B contains information on the military and police posts in the western part of the land border, and includes the data provided by the Global Positioning System recorded by the verification team and the number of personnel at each post.

4.                  Second Visit:  Caribbean Sea  

The second visit of the OAS Verification Mission took place August 15 to 21, 2001.  The Mission first traveled to Tegucigalpa on August 15 and 16, to coordinate logistical and operational details with Honduran Authorities (Foreign, Defense, and Security Ministries, as well as the Army and Navy).  On August 17 the Mission held a similar set of meetings with Nicaraguan officials in Managua  (Foreign, Defense, and Security Ministries, as well as the Army).  

During the early afternoon of August 18, the Mission arrived by plane to Puerto Cabezas, a Nicaraguan port town on the Atlantic Coast.  The town has a port authority, run by the Nicaraguan Navy, since the 1980s, according to information provided to the Mission.  This was a small outpost, similar in size to the type of posts observed during the first visit along the land border.  The post consisted of 15 marines, who had only one fast patrol boat at their disposal.  The vessel was approximately fifteen feet long, powered by twin outboard motors, carries a crew of 4 marines, and is equipped to carry two 12.7 mm machine guns plus a heavier 20 mm cannon in the center of the boat.  The craft was unarmed during our visit, the guns being in storage on shore.  

Departing from Puerto Cabezas in the afternoon of August 18, on a 90 foot fishing vessel rented for the trip, the Mission sailed north to an area off the Honduran Coast near the town of Raya, in undisputed Honduran waters.  The Mission arrived at the area around 5:00 a.m. on August 19 and did not find any naval presence or naval installations (docks, boat houses, boats, or other military facilities).  The Mission would have sailed further up the Honduran coast to Barra de Caratasca, but was not able to do so for lack of time in view of the impending approach of Hurricane Chantale, which was forecast to hit the area that afternoon.  Accordingly, the police posts at Raya and at Puerto Lempira, along with the Honduran Navy�s Rescue base at Barra de Caratasca were visited during the third visit in October.  

The Mission proceeded to the maritime area, object of the dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua.  Both the Honduran and Nicaraguan Governments had informed the Mission, in writing, of their desire for the OAS to consider verifying some of the cays in this area.   

The Mission discovered that some of the cays in the area had abandoned shacks which were severely storm-damaged, but not inhabited.  Other cays were inhabited by fishermen and their families.  The Mission did not find any military or police presence in the area or on the cays visited.  

At first light on August 20, the Mission arrived at Cayos Miskitos, a large archipelago in undisputed Nicaraguan waters where the Nicaraguan Navy has a small outpost housing 13 marines equipped with one fast patrol boat of the type described above, also unarmed at the time.  The Lieutenant in charge explained that the current base had been recently built in July, to replace a previous structure destroyed in hurricane Caesar (1996).  The Lieutenant informed the Mission, as the Cabezas Port Authority had done, that there had been Nicaraguan military presence in the area since 1982.  

Local civilians informed the Mission that the military had first established a permanent presence in Morrison Dennis Keys (about 10 nautical miles away, but still in the Cayo Miskitos Archipelago) around October 2000.  The military then moved to a small dwelling in the village at Cayo Miskito sometime in January 2001, moving subsequently to their current post in late July.  According to the locals, prior to October 2000 the Nicaraguan Marines came to the area in boats from their permanent base in Puerto Cabezas.  The Second Visit concluded its verification at Cayos Miskitos, returning to Puerto Cabezas on August 21.  

Appendix C contains information on the military and police posts in the Caribbean Sea.  

5.                  Third Visit:  Eastern Land Border Area

The Mission�s third visit took place October 14-18, 2001.  The Mission, along with the civilian representatives of the two governments, visited military and police posts along the eastern part of the land border, using helicopters provided by the armed forces of the countries.   

The Mission visited five Nicaraguan border posts, four military and one police post, beginning with the military post at Bolinki which is located approximately in the center of the Isthmus on the banks of the Coco River.  The Coco constitutes the border for the entire eastern-half of the land border between the two countries, and the other four posts, San Andr�s de Bocay, Wasp�n (2), and Leymus, are all located along its banks.  The Mission subsequently visited three Honduran posts, two police posts (one in the town of Puerto Lempira, the other in the coastal town of Raya), and one search and rescue post belonging to the Honduran Navy, located on the Caribbean coast at Barra de Caratasca.  

The Mission followed the same procedure as for the first visit, asking the officer in charge a series of questions to ascertain how many persons were assigned to each post, the quantity and type of arms stored there, and whether there were any other posts nearby.  The Mission also interviewed local civilians living in the vicinity of the border posts.  

At the Puerto Lempira police station, which is the headquarters for all police stations located in the Honduran Mosquitia, the police commissioner informed the Mission of the existence of a small police border post located in the village of Suh�, manned by three police officers.  This post was not included in the documentation provided by the Honduran Government to the General Secretariat. The transparent manner in which the Commissioner provided the Mission with this and other information, the probable size of the post, and its extremely remote location, led the mission to conclude that a visit there was not necessary and that the omission of Suh� from the list of posts to be inspected was due an administrative error.  

When asked about the number and type of weapons that the officers stationed in Puerto Lempira possessed (a question the Mission posed at each border post in order to correlate the number of weapons on hand with the number of personnel assigned to the post) the Commissioner said that aside from the normal quantity of regulations arms (30 Galil semi-automatic rifles), the post had 100 FAL 7.62mm semi-automatic rifles in storage.  This, the Commissioner explained further, was because all the old rifles from all the police stations in his area of responsibility (which included a number of posts in the interior of the country which were not considered border posts), had been replaced by modern Galil semi-automatic riles; the old rifles were waiting to be transported back to Tegucigalpa.  

The small naval base at Barra de Caratasca was visited as if it constituted part of the second verification visit since it is a military installation on the Caribbean Sea, and since the Mission was not able to travel there during its August visit.   The base consisted of five marines, equipped with a specialized unarmed search and rescue vessel of approximately 25 feet in length, capable of high seas navigation.  

Some minor variations in the number of personnel assigned to the military and police posts on both sides of the border were found, in some cases more, in other cases less than what the Mission expected to find.   On the Nicaraguan side, the Mission was informed that a small increase in police officers in Wasp�n, and military personnel in Bolinki, was due to the fact that both the police and the army were being tasked with additional security and logistical details related to the November 4, 2001 Presidential elections.  

Appendix D contains information on the military and police posts along the eastern part of the land border.  

6.                  Conclusions: 

At all of the posts visited along the land borders, it was possible to ascertain that the personnel, arms, communications equipment, and the number of staff assigned were in keeping with the functions and responsibilities of vigilance and patrol which are part of the work of all police or military border posts, meant to accomplish the following objectives:  

a.           Take action against gangs of criminals who engage primarily in cattle theft;  

b.           Prevent smuggling and the illegal trafficking of arms, drugs, and undocumented workers; and  

c.             Exercise sovereignty, in the case of the military posts.  

It is important to note that the border posts are staffed by the minimum number required to perform effectively the work assigned.  A reduced number of military and police personnel is assigned to the border, i.e., a total of 179 in Honduras and 334 in Nicaragua.  In the Mission�s opinion, the staffing of military and police posts on both sides of the border does not represent a threat to peace or an indication of increased military presence in the border area.  

The military installations in the Caribbean Sea, two on the Nicaraguan side, and one on the Honduran side, are of such a small size as to limit operations to the immediate vicinity of their base of operations.  The Mission did not notice any tensions related to the maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the areas it visited.  

The Verification Mission holds the view that the minor technical problems observed did not represent evidence of a deliberate desire to change conditions along the border or to violate the spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding of March 7, 2000.  The atmosphere of transparency prevailing in the two governments supports this view.  The few discrepancies encountered are probably attributed to decisions made at local level rather than plans arising from the capitals, or else are the result of administrative errors.  In the opinion of the Verification Mission, these discrepancies could be described as minor and inconsequential.